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Abstract
We analyze the eects of trade liberalization on environmental policies in a strategic setting
when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom
in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse o. This is not due to the terms
of trade motive, but rather the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of
transboundary pollution. With command and control policies (emission quotas), countries are
unable to inuence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no
race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable quotas, unless pollution is a pure
global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. Under free trade,
internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level and strictly welfare-
dominate taxes. The ordering of internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes depends,
among other things, on the degree of international pollution spillovers.
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A serious concern about the relationship between trade and environmental policy is that these two
issues have usually been dealt with separately in real-world bilateral or multilateral agreements.
When trade agreements forbid the use of trade policies to pursue terms of trade goals, governments
may use domestic environmental policies as a second best method of pursuing their terms of trade
objectives. Other reasons that might motivate the distortion of domestic environmental policies
are the competition to attract more industries (capital) from countries with stricter policies and
to capture rents from foreign rms in the presence of imperfect competition. While prior research
has shown that, when there are no transboundary externalities, negotiating taris, in conjunction
with commitments to market access, can lead to eciency (see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger
(2001)), eciency will not result from trade agreements alone when there are transboundary
externalities. In this paper we explore the eects of trade liberalization on environmental outcomes
and welfare, in the presence of transboundary pollution, when environmental policy is set non-
cooperatively. We compare and provide welfare rankings of dierent pollution policy instruments.
The literature on trade and environmental policy in the presence of an international spillover
of emissions is too vast to be adequately surveyed here. Some papers assume the pollution
externality aects rm productivity, whereas other papers assume the externality hurts households
(an \eyesore" externality). Papers also dier in terms of the policy tools allowed (domestic policies,
border policies, or both), the number of policy active countries, and in terms of country size. Since
we investigate how, in the presence of an eyesore transboundary externality, the movement from
autarky to free trade aects domestic policy and welfare, our literature review focuses on papers
with similar structures.
Markusen (1975), one of the rst papers to address transboundary pollution, considers one
policy active country that uses both taris and domestic policy to inuence the terms of trade
and global pollution output. Rauscher (1997) derives the optimal environmental tax under free
trade for a large country that suers from transboundary pollution. He nds that \carbon leak-
age" occurs if stricter domestic environmental policy leads to increases in foreign emissions and
concludes that with \substantial leakage eects, optimal environmental policies tend to lead to
too low emission tax rates" when the pure terms of trade eects are small compared to leakage
eects. In contrast to these papers, we consider a game in which both countries are policy-active
and compare dierent policy instruments.
1Ludema and Wooton (1994) consider strategic policy in a two country asymmetric trade
model with transboundary pollution. Foreign production, which is exported to the home country,
generates eyesore pollution that aects only the home country. Under a free trade agreement
the foreign country, which is not aected by the pollution, implements environmental policies to
manipulate its terms of trade, while the home country uses process standards1 to improve its
terms of trade and restrict the incidence of transboundary pollution. We, on the other hand,
use a more general structure where there is two-way ow of pollution between two policy-active
countries and the only policy instrument is an emission policy. We also compare dierent policy
instruments.
Copeland and Taylor (1995) study a Heckscher-Ohlin two factor model in which eyesore
pollution is one of two primary inputs. Assuming pollution is a pure global public good and
that there is free trade, they evaluate the welfare implications of trade when countries non-
cooperatively choose their environmental policy, pollution permits. While most of the paper
assumes countries ignore the eect of their policies on world prices2, even when countries take
into account this eect, the equilibrium coincides with the earlier case3 because of the pure global
public good nature of pollution. We, on the other hand, consider a strategic game and compare
dierent policy instruments. However, we derive a similar result in our model, as a special case,
in Section 5.3, when pollution is a pure global public bad.
Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003) consider strategic interactions between two closed economies
with respect to environmental policies. Emissions (a by-product of production) cause global warm-
ing that reduces welfare in both countries. They nd emission taxes and quotas are equivalent,
while emission standards lead to over-production of the polluting good. Although, in our model,
there is no trade in equilibrium, the opportunity to trade and aect world prices breaks the
equivalence of taxes and quotas.
Kiyono and Ishikawa (2004) look at carbon leakage through trade in fossil fuel by specifying
a partial equilibrium model in which two large countries import fuel, an input in the production
of a nal good. Regulation of emissions, a by-product of the use of fuel in production, only by
the home country leads to carbon leakage, as changes in the world price of fuel aect pollution
1As the authors themselves note, such standards would be in violation of WTO rules, so we are not sure if such
policies would be viable under free trade.
2In essence, they assume there are a large number of Northern and a large number of Southern countries.
3With factor price equalization, under free trade, as compared to autarky, emissions rise in the South and fall
in the North, while aggregate world pollution is unaected.
2emissions in the other country. Because of strategic eects, they nd world pollution is lower when
both countries use quotas, rather then taxes, to regulate emissions. We model dierent sources
of generation of pollution, possibility of abatement and also of trade between two countries.
Furthermore, we compare and rank taxes, quotas and internationally tradable quotas.
We use a two good, two country trade model to analyze the eects of liberalizing trade while
leaving domestic policy unconstrained in the presence of transboundary pollution. Our model
nests a number of dierent scenarios: pollution may be generated as a by-product of the produc-
tion of either or both goods. It also allows for substitutability between inputs that can reduce
emissions, the possibility of abatement and having polluting as well as non-polluting inputs.
Hence, our model covers various possible sources of generation of pollution. We assume that
pollution causes an \eyesore" transboundary externality, in the sense that it reduces welfare in
both countries. There are three potential distortions in our model: rst, there is a production
distortion, a domestic externality that drives a wedge between the private and social costs. Sec-
ond, countries are large and hence have incentives to manipulate their terms of trade and lastly,
the presence of transboundary pollution implies an ecient allocation cannot be achieved when
countries practice free trade but set domestic environmental policies non-cooperatively.
Within this framework we compare dierent policy instruments, environmental taxes and quo-
tas, and rank welfare under these instruments when countries strategically set domestic policy.
We nd that, if governments use taxes, the movement from autarky to free trade can result in an
equilibrium in which both countries use lower taxes and achieve lower welfare than under autarky.
This race to the bottom occurs not because of the terms of trade eect (as there is no trade in
equilibrium), but rather because - in a strategic setting in an open economy - the government
relaxes environmental taxes to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution from abroad (i.e.,
to reduce \carbon leakage" in the free trade equilibrium). This race to the bottom does not occur
when (globally nontradable) emission quotas, rather then taxes, are used. However, if interna-
tional trade in emission permits is allowed, then a race to the bottom will occur if pollution is not
a pure global public bad4. Thus, we nd that in the symmetric free trade equilibrium, pollution
is lowest with internationally nontradable quotas and the internationally nontradable emissions
quota equilibrium is strictly welfare-superior to the emissions tax equilibrium. When pollution
is not a pure global public bad, the internationally tradable quota equilibrium welfare dominates
4If the marginal damage in the home country from foreign emissions is positive, but less than that from domestic
emissions, then there is transboundary pollution but it is not a pure global public bad.
3the tax equilibrium only under certain conditions; however, the former strictly dominates the
latter if pollution is a pure global public bad.
In general there is a consensus that price-based policies are superior to quantity instruments.
We show that this is not necessarily true in the presence of an international transboundary ex-
ternality in a strategic setting. Apart from deriving the non-equivalence of taxes and quotas, we
also provide welfare-rankings of dierent policy instruments. This has important policy implica-
tions regarding international negotiations; as will be shown, when countries negotiate on trade
liberalization, it might be benecial to negotiate on the environmental policy instrument also.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2 and Section
3 derives the autarky equilibrium. Section 4 looks at the ecient equilibrium, while Section 5
explores the strategic free trade equilibrium, and compares pollution and welfare under dierent
policy instruments. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We conduct our analysis using a standard two good (X;Y ) model of trade between two countries,




V )  0; gx;gy < 0 < gz;gvi (1)
where z is pollution and
  !
V is the vector of inputs5. The production possibility function nests the
case in which pollution is generated as a by-product of production of either6 or both goods. It also
allows for substitutability between inputs that can reduce emissions, the possibility of abatement
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i (2)
5If there are a number of domestic rms, f, each with production sets dened by g
f(xf;yf;zf;
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V , there is no guarantee that, in the presence of an externality, individual
(prot-maximizing) decisions will lead to production on the societal production possibility frontier. However, if
all producers face the same prices for all goods and factors, including the externality, zf, then individual prot
maximization will lead to production on the aggregate production possibility frontier. If pollution is regulated
domestically by quotas rather than taxes, then these quotas must be traded internally. Hereafter we assume that
domestic policies lead to production on the societal production possibility frontier.
6This specication subsumes the case in which pollution and output of good X (for example) are in xed
proportion.
4Total pollution in the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
Z = z + z; Z = z + z;  2 (0;1] (3)
i.e., total pollution in the home (foreign) country consists of two components: domestic emissions,
z (z), and the inow of transboundary pollution, z (z), from the other country. When  < 1,
domestic emissions cause a higher marginal damage in the home country than foreign emissions,
while pollution is a pure global public bad if  = 1.
Let cx(c
x) and cy(c
y) denote consumption of X and Y in the home (foreign) country. Prefer-
ences of the representative agent in the home country are given by a twice dierentiable concave
utility function
U(cx;cy;Z) = (cx;cy)   Z; cx;cy; > 0 (4)
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x;c
y; > 0 (5)
3 Autarky
We rst solve the domestic social planner's problem. Assuming home and foreign actions are taken
simultaneously, the benevolent home government maximizes its own citizen's welfare, which yields













i.e., the domestic rate of transformation equals the marginal rate of substitution. However, private
agents in the economy do not take into account the domestic distortion in their decision making























y are the producer prices of X and Y respectively; tz is the market price of pollution,
i.e., tax on pollution. Producers equate the domestic rate of transformation to the producer price











y are the consumer prices of X and Y respectively. Consumers equate the marginal
rate of substitution to the consumer price ratio. Comparing the optimality conditions of the social
planner, producers and consumers, eqs. (7), (9) and (10) respectively, it is clear that the best






i.e., a tax on emissions equal to the domestic marginal damage of emissions. Note that this
autarky solution, although optimal from each country's perspective, is inecient from the global
perspective as governments do not internalize the transboundary eect of their emissions.
4 Ecient Equilibrium
To obtain Pareto ecient allocations we solve a social planner's problem that maximizes the
welfare of the home country subject to meeting a certain utility target for the foreign country.
Naturally, the social planner accounts for the domestic and transboundary externalities. The











































6The marginal rate of substitution is equated across countries and the domestic rate of transfor-
mation in each country is equated to the marginal rate of substitution, taking into account the
eect of emissions on both country's welfare. Hence, the Pareto ecient emissions taxes in the


















i.e., the ecient tax is equal to the sum of marginal damages in the two countries. Hence, eciency
need not require equalization of environmental taxes across countries, but it does require that both
countries internalize the domestic and transboundary eects of emissions7.
5 Free Trade
In this section we analyze the eects of a movement from autarky to free trade and how the
choice of the policy instrument governs these eects. We consider each country's optimal non-
cooperative environmental policy, given that they have committed to free trade8 and that they
act simultaneously. We consider three cases: i) governments regulate emissions using a tax on
domestic emissions, ii) emission quotas are used to regulate pollution, and these quotas are not
tradable across countries, and iii) internationally tradable quotas are the environmental policy
instruments. Finally, we compare pollution and welfare under these dierent instruments.
5.1 Taxes
The only policy instrument available to each country is a tax on emissions. Let good Y be the
numeraire, hence we set the world price of Y , py  1. Let p be the (world) price of X. Further,
suppose that tz and t
z denote the pollution taxes in the home and foreign countries, respectively.
The GNP functions9 for the home and foreign countries are, respectively,
R(p;tz); R(p;t
z)




z if, and only if, c
y > cy.
8This can be due to trade agreements that restrict the use of trade policies.
9The revenue function is given by: maxx;y;z(px + y   tzz) s.t. g(x;y;z;
  !
V )  0. If all rms face the same
prices (px;py;tz) for goods and for the factors, V , then individual prot maximization, together with factor market
equilibrium, will lead to GNP maximization, or the revenue function as dened above. See footnote 5 for more
details.
7The expenditure functions for the home country and the foreign country are10, respectively,
e(p;u + fz + zg); e(p;u + fz + zg)
Equilibrium is described by the income constraints (balance of trade constraints) for the two
countries and a market clearing condition:
e(p;u + fz + zg) = R(p;tz) + tzz (18)




p = x + x (20a)
x = Rp; x = R
p (20b)
z =  Rtz; z =  R
t
z (20c)
where eqs. (18), (19) and (20) are the resource constraints for the home and foreign countries, and
the market clearing conditions, respectively; tz (t
z) is the pollution tax in the home (foreign) coun-
try. We assume that governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their domestic
tax to maximize welfare. Also, all tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum to consumers.
Taking the total dierential of eqs. (18) and (20c), we have
eudu + (eu   tz)dz + eudz = (Rp   ep)dp; dz =  Rtztzdtz   Rptzdp (21)














Dierentiating eq. (18) with respect to tz, we get the home country's best response function
10Due to the presence of the externality, the expenditure function is given by: mincx;cy(pxcx+cy) s.t. (cx;cy) 
Z  u ) mincx;cy(pxcx + cy) s.t. (cx;cy)  u + Z.




= (Rp   ep)
dp
dtz







The rst term, the terms of trade eect, depends on whether the country is a net importer of X
and the pollution intensity of X which, in turn, determines the direction of change in the price of X
due to a change in the pollution tax, tz. The second term is the eect of changes in tz on domestic
pollution: as tz increases, domestic emissions decline. An increase in the domestic environmental
tax reduces domestic production of the pollution intensive good resulting, under trade, in an
increase in the world price of that good, which increases foreign production and emissions. Thus,
the last term is the transboundary pollution eect and reects the role of carbon leakage.
























Note that eqs. (23) and (24) can also be solved for the optimal autarky pollution taxes. In autarky
domestic production equals domestic consumption, i.e., Rp(:) = ep(:), and foreign pollution is
independent of domestic policy, i.e., dz
dtz = 0; hence, from eq. (23) we have eu
du
dtz = (tz   eu) dz
dtz.
Since dz
dtz < 0 and eu > 0, it follows that the optimal autarky pollution tax for the home country
is
ta
z = eu (25)




However, with free trade both z and z are aected by the environmental policy in the other
country. Totally dierentiating eq. (20) yields, after simplication:
epudu + e














where we dene   epp   Rpp < 0 and   e
pp   R
pp < 0.







































































where Mx (= ep  Rp) is the imports of the home country. In equilibrium we have Mx +M
x = 0.
The above system can be inverted and solved. However, to simplify the calculations, we assume
quasi-linear preferences (so that the income eect on demand for X is zero, i.e., epu = e
pu = 0)





 +  (29)
Hence,
dp
dtz > 0 if X is relatively more pollution intensive than Y , i.e., if @x
@tz = Rptz < 0 (since
(+) < 0). Furthermore, the change in foreign pollution due to a change in the home country's















 +  (30)
Since ( + ) < 0, dz
dtz > 0 under symmetry, irrespective of whether X or Y is relatively more
pollution intensive, i.e., foreign emissions unambiguously increase due to an increase in the home
country's pollution taxes.
Note that our model nests the case of no externality, i.e., when  = 0, and also the case of
no transboundary pollution, i.e.,  = 0. In the case of no externality, the home country's best










If the home country is a net importer of X (Mx > 0), and X is pollution intensive, i.e., Rptz < 0,
10then
dp






< 0. This is the standard terms of trade argument in eect: a large
country should subsidize domestic production of the importable if the use of commercial policies
is prohibited.
Assumption 1. Countries are said to be symmetric if they have the same preferences and tech-
nology.
Denition 1. The symmetric equilibrium occurs when countries have the same preferences
and technology, and adopt identical policies.
Now consider the case of a transboundary pollution externality. Consider the symmetric
equilibrium, i.e., where tz = t
z, and thus Mx = 0. Evaluating eq. (23) at the autarky solution,
ta













Intuitively, the result in eq. (31) follows because increases in domestic taxes increase foreign
pollution, i.e., dz
dtz > 0. Thus, the transboundary pollution eect, due to carbon leakage, in our
symmetric model, leads to lower environmental taxes for both countries under free trade. We
summarize our result in the following proposition
Proposition 1. In the symmetric equilibrium, if ta is the optimal autarky tax in each country,
then under free trade each country's optimal response is to choose a tax rate less than ta.
This policy is optimal for both countries. Hence, assuming identical solutions and uniqueness,
we have
Proposition 2. If countries set environmental taxes non-cooperatively but otherwise pursue free
trade, then, in the symmetric equilibrium,
1. there is a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, and
2. both countries are worse o under free trade relative to autarky.
Note that even if we deviate from our symmetry assumption, by continuity, if countries are
suciently similar then the above results hold. Thus,
Corollary 1. If countries are suciently similar then a move from autarky to free trade will
make both countries worse o if environmental taxes are set non-cooperatively.
11An important implication of this is that the more similar countries are, the more likely it is
that trade liberalization will lead to lower welfare in both countries. While the primary role of
domestic environmental policies is regulation of pollution, in an open economy one must consider
the impact of these policies both on the terms of trade and on foreign pollution (if transboundary
pollution is present). The reason for under taxation of pollution, in our symmetric equilibrium,
is strictly due to the transboundary pollution eect, i.e., the incentive to reduce carbon
leakage leads countries to lower the domestic environmental tax, resulting in a race to the bottom
in environmental outcomes.
5.2 Quotas
Now suppose both governments use command and control policies, such as upper bounds on
emissions, instead of taxes. Hence z  Lz and z  L
z, where Lz and L
z are the emission
limits in the home and foreign countries, respectively11. Governments simultaneously and non-
cooperatively choose their quota levels to maximize welfare. Dene the (shadow) value of a quota
in the home (foreign) country as ^ z (^ 
z). If the quotas are auctioned o or traded domestically,
then ^ z and ^ 
z are the market prices of the quotas in the home and foreign countries, respectively.
Equilibrium is now described by
e(p;u + fz + zg) = R(p; ^ z) + ^ zLz (32)
e(p;u + fz + zg) = R(p; ^ 




p = x + x (34a)
x = Rp; x = R
p (34b)




where eqs. (32), (33) and (34) are the income constraints for the home and foreign countries, and
the market clearing conditions, respectively. The quota rents (revenues) are rebated lump-sum to
11When quotas are used to regulate domestic pollution, and when there are multiple rms, then in order to reach
the production possibility frontier, these quotas must be allocated eciently among domestic producers. This could
be done via an omniscient and omnipotent central planner or, more plausibly, by allowing quotas to be tradable
domestically. We assume the latter to be true.
12consumers. We assume that the quotas bind; hence, ^ z; ^ 
z > 0, and eq. (34c) holds with equality.
Taking the total dierential of eq. (32) we have
eudu + eudz   ^ zdLz + eudz = (Rp   ep)dp; dz = dLz (35)
Similarly, totally dierentiating eq. (33) we have
e
udu + e





p)dp; dz = dL
z (36)
Dierentiating eq. (32) with respect to Lz gives the home country's best response function as




= (Rp   ep)
dp
dLz







The rst and second terms are the terms of trade and domestic pollution eects, respectively,
while the last term is the eect of changes in the incidence of transboundary pollution on domes-
tic welfare. The terms of trade eect depends on whether the importable of the home country
is pollution intensive. Issuing an additional permit, given that the quota binds, increases domes-
tic emissions. If foreign emissions change following changes in domestic quotas, then it aects
domestic welfare via a change in the incidence of transboundary pollution.
























Eqs. (37) and (38) can be solved for the optimal autarky pollution quotas. In autarky, domestic
consumption equals domestic production, i.e., ep(:) = Rp(:), the quota binds, i.e., z = Lz, and
foreign pollution is independent of domestic policy, i.e., dz
dLz = 0; hence, from eq. (37), we have
eu
du
dLz = ^ z   eu. Since eu > 0, the domestic pollution tax equivalent of the optimal autarky
pollution quota for the home country is
^ a
z = eu (39)





These are, obviously, the same autarky implicit taxes as in the previous section, where taxes are
the policy tools.
Now consider each country's optimal non-cooperative environmental policy, given a commit-
ment to free trade. Let za and za be the autarky pollution (quota) levels in the home and foreign
countries, respectively. Furthermore, consider the home country's optimal choice of pollution
quota, given that the foreign country chooses its autarky quota level. Since the quotas must bind
in the autarky equilibrium za = za 12, then, given L
z = za, by continuity there must exist








z = za = za = Lz, then at Lz = za, z(Lz;L
z) = za, and Rp(:) = ep(:). Thus, evaluating eq.







Hence, for our symmetric specication, the optimal domestic quota and the equivalent pollution
tax are the same in the free trade and autarky equilibrium. We summarize our result in the
following proposition
Proposition 3. Suppose governments use emission limits, rather than taxes to regulate pollution.
Then, in the symmetric equilibrium, the autarky and free trade equilibria will be the same and
there is no race to the bottom in environmental policy.
To see why this result follows, suppose that X is the pollution intensive good and the foreign
government imposes an upper bound on emissions equal to the autarky level, i.e., it regulates
domestic pollution such that z  L
z = za
. For any domestic emission level z < za, the reduced
world output of good X (compared to the autarky situation) results in higher prices than in the
(symmetric) autarky equilibrium and so the foreign country would want to increase its production
of the pollution intensive good, X. Hence, the foreign pollution limit will bind. As the home
12The pollution quotas will always bind under the parametric assumptions gx;gy < 0 < gz.
14country increases its pollution quota level, Lz, in the domain Lz < za, the foreign pollution limit
continues to bind and thus dz
dLz = 0 in the domain Lz < za. Furthermore, at Lz = za, a (small)
increase in Lz results in a (small) decline in the world price of the pollution intensive good, X,
relative to autarky levels. Although the market value of a foreign emission quota falls, ^ 
z > 0
and hence the foreign quota continues to bind, leaving foreign emissions unaected. Hence, in
the neighborhood of Lz = za, we have dz
dLz = 0, i.e., changes in the domestic quota level do not
aect foreign emissions. Recall that, in our symmetric model, the driving force behind the race
to the bottom in taxes was the motive to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. Since,
when emission quotas are used, changes in domestic policy do not inuence foreign emissions,
countries follow the same policies as in autarky. Thus, although typically there is a presumption
that price-based policies are superior to command and control policies, in a strategic setting that
need not be the case, and the equivalence between the two in closed economies breaks down once
there is the possibility of trade between countries (even though in our symmetric model, there is
no trade in equilibrium).
5.3 Tradable Quotas
We analyze the interaction between goods trade and permit trade, and consider the situation in
which governments regulate emissions using quotas but, following Copeland and Taylor (1995),
these quotas are tradable across the countries, i.e., countries practice free trade not only in goods,
but also in permits. Both countries simultaneously issue emission quotas13 and the quotas issued
by one country can be used in the other country also, i.e., there exists an international emission
permits market. Thus, the market price of pollution quotas, z, is equalized across countries.
Governments simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their own quota limits to maximize
welfare. Equilibrium is now described by
e(p;u + fz + zg) = R(p;z) + zLz (43)
e(p;u + fz + zg) = R(p;z) + zL
z (44)
ep + e
p = x + x = Rp + R
p (45a)
13There is no restriction on the number of quotas that each country can issue.
15z + z =  Rz   R
z  Lz + L
z (45b)
where eqs. (43), (44) and (45) are the balance of trade constraints for the home and foreign
countries, and the market clearing conditions, respectively. We assume that the quotas bind;
hence, z > 0 and
 Rz   R
z = Lz + L
z (46)
Note that, as shown in the previous section, the emission tax equivalent of the optimal autarky
quota in the home and foreign countries are, respectively, a
z = eu and a
z = e
u.
Taking the total dierential of eq. (43) we have
eudu + eudz + eudz   zdLz   (Lz + Rz)dz = (Rp   ep)dp;
dz + dz = dLz + dL
z and   Rz   R

z = Lz + L
z (47)













dz + dz = dLz + dL
z and   Rz   R

z = Lz + L
z (48)
The best response function of the home country in terms of the foreign country's quota is





= (Rp   ep)
dp
dLz
+ (Lz + Rz)
dz
dLz
+ (z   eu)
dz
dLz






dLz = 1. The net domestic welfare eect of issuing an additional quota depends
on a number of dierent eects. The rst term, the terms of trade eect, depends on the pattern
of trade, while the second term is the quota revenue eect, and it depends on whether the home
country is an importer of emission quotas. The third term is the eect on domestic welfare through
changes in domestic emissions: if some of the new quotas are used domestically, then domestic
emissions increase. The last term, the transboundary pollution eect, depends on whether foreign
emissions increase with an increase in domestic quotas and on the public bad characteristic of
pollution.

























































( + )(Rzz + R
zz) + (Rpz + R
pz)2 (53)
Since both countries face the same price vectors, if we dene J(p;z)  R(p;z) + R(p;z), then
J(p;z) is convex in prices. Hence, the denominator in the above equation is negative and dz
dLz < 0.




















( + )(Rzz + R
zz) + (Rpz + R
pz)2 2 (0;1) (54)





Consider, as before, the symmetric equilibrium: if Lz = za = za = L
z, then ep(:) = Rp(:)













z   eu) > 0 if the marginal damage from domestic pollution is higher than that from trans-
14Recall that we assume quasi-linear preferences, so epu = e

pu = 0.
17boundary pollution, i.e., if  < 1, and eq. (54) ) dz






> 0 if  < 1 (56)
We summarize our result in the following proposition
Proposition 4. If domestic emissions result in a higher marginal damage than transboundary
pollution, i.e., if  < 1, then, in the symmetric equilibrium, under free trade in both goods and
emission permits, each country's optimal response is to choose a quota level higher than the
equilibrium autarky quota level, La
z.
As this policy is optimal for both countries, assuming identical solutions and uniqueness, we
have the following
Proposition 5. In the symmetric equilibrium, if the marginal damage from domestic emissions
is higher than that from transboundary pollution, i.e., if  < 1, and countries set emission quotas
non-cooperatively but otherwise pursue free trade in goods and emission quotas, then
1. there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy, and
2. both countries are worse o under free trade relative to autarky.
If we move away from our assumption of symmetry, as long as countries are suciently
similar, then, by continuity, the above results hold.
Corollary 2. If countries are suciently similar and emission quotas are set non-cooperatively,
then a move from autarky to free trade in both goods and quotas will make both countries worse o
if the marginal damage from domestic emissions is higher than that from transboundary pollution,
i.e., if  < 1.
Thus, the more similar countries are, the more likely it is that both countries will be worse o
due to trade liberalization if  < 1. Note that, in the symmetric equilibrium, assuming identical






= 0 if  = 1 (57)
Thus, we have
18Proposition 6. If pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if  = 1, then, in the symmetric
equilibrium, the free trade equilibrium with internationally tradable pollution permits is the same
as the autarky and internationally nontradable permit equilibria and there is no race to the bottom
in environmental policy.
Proposition 6 reects the result in Copeland and Taylor (1995) where, due to the pure global
public bad nature of pollution, the strategic and non-strategic free trade equilibria coincide. In
autarky, issuing an additional permit results in an accompanying increase in pollution by 1 unit,
given that the quota binds. However, when pollution is not a pure global public bad, with free
trade in goods and permits, in the symmetric equilibrium, when the home country issues an
additional quota, it leads to a less than proportional increase in domestic pollution as some of the
additional quotas are used in the foreign country; now pollution increases by 1
2(1+) < 1 if  < 1.
Furthermore, the home country also raises revenue from the sale of quotas to the foreign country,
which exceeds the marginal damage from increased incidence of transboundary pollution. This
leads to a race to the bottom in pollution policies when the marginal damage from transboundary
pollution is less than that from domestic pollution. However, if pollution is a pure global public
bad, i.e., if  = 1, the source of emissions does not matter as the marginal damage is the same
irrespective of the origin of pollution, and there is no incentive to issue more quotas under trade
as compared to autarky; hence, there is no race to the bottom.
5.4 Pollution and Welfare
In this section we derive the optimal (equivalent) taxes and compare welfare under dierent policy
instruments. We also derive conditions under which the (symmetric) internationally tradable
quota equilibrium is strictly welfare-superior to the (symmetric) tax equilibrium. The equilibrium
non-cooperative pollution tax under autarky is ta
z = eu, while the Pareto ecient tax is
te
z = eu + e
u > ta
z (58)
In autarky taxes and quotas are equivalent, i.e.,
ta
z = ^ a
z = a
z = eu (59)
Hence, we have
19Proposition 7. Under autarky the choice of policy instrument to regulate pollution does not
matter, i.e., environmental taxes and quotas are equivalent.
This result is similar to Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003), who nd that in closed economies,
emission taxes and quotas are equivalent. In the open economy case, when the policy instrument is
an environmental tax, the non-cooperative equilibrium pollution tax for the home country can be
calculated using eq. (23). Setting du
dtz = 0, and using eqs. (21) - (27), we have the non-cooperative
equilibrium pollution tax as15








In the non-cooperative symmetric equilibrium, assuming an identical and unique solution, we have
Mx = 0, Rptz = R
pt
z, and  = , so




< eu = ta
z (60)
With internationally nontradable permits, in the symmetric case, the autarky and free trade
equilibria coincide, and the pollution tax equivalent of the optimal free trade quota is
^ z = eu = ta
z (61)
Finally, with internationally tradable permits, the emission tax equivalent of the equilibrium
level of tradable quotas can be found by equating du
dL = 0 in eq. (49), using the fact that Rz =  Lz







= eu + eu(   1)
dz
dLz
< eu = ^ z ,  < 1
The LHS reects the revenue raised by an additional tradable quota, the RHS the damages done
to the domestic economy due to the additional pollution generated by that quota. If  = 1, the
quotas issued (equivalent tax for the quota) are the same for both internationally tradable and
nontradable quotas, whereas for  < 1, the tradable quota system leads to more quotas (lower




15Of course, this is the formula which determines the tax - it has to be evaluated at the equilibrium price and
pollution levels.
20have
z = eu  
eu
2
(1   ) (62)
Thus,





; where M 2 (0;1) (63)
Hence, the eective taxes under the alternative policies can be ordered as follows
te
z > ta
z = ^ z = z > tz if  = 1
te
z > ta
z = ^ z > z > tz if 1 >  > M
te
z > ta
z = ^ z > tz > z if M >  > 0
te
z > ta
z = ^ z = tz > z if  = 0 (64)
We summarize these results in the following proposition
Proposition 8. If countries simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose pollution policies but
otherwise pursue free trade, then, in the symmetric equilibrium,
1. if pollution is a pure global public bad, i.e., if  = 1, then the pollution tax equivalent for
the case of internationally tradable and nontradable quotas are equal and are both higher
(emissions are lower) than in the case in which pollution taxes are the policy instrument;
2. if international pollution spillovers are large, but not complete, i.e., if  2 (M;1), then
the pollution tax equivalent is highest for internationally nontradable quotas, intermediate
in the case of internationally tradable quotas and lowest in the case in which pollution taxes
are the policy instrument;
3. if international spillovers occur but are not too large, i.e., if  2 (0;M), then the pollu-
tion tax equivalent is highest in the case of internationally nontradable quotas, intermediate
in the case in which pollution taxes are the policy instrument and lowest in the case of
internationally tradable quotas;
4. if there are no international spillovers, i.e., if  = 0, then internationally nontradable quotas
and pollution taxes result in the same tax equivalent (and pollution level), which equals the
ecient level, while internationally tradable quotas result in a lower pollution tax equivalent
21and more pollution.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. With internationally nontradable quota levels
set simultaneously, each government can ignore the impact of its own policy on the foreign level
of pollution. If there are no international spillovers, i.e., if  = 0, this choice leads to eciency
but, of course, in the presence of international spillovers, pollution emissions will be too high.
In the case of pollution taxes, the home government realizes that an increase in tax on domestic
pollution will, given the foreign pollution tax, lead to carbon leakage, i.e., to an increase in
foreign pollution levels due to changes in the prices of internationally traded goods.
Assuming Rptz = @x
@tz < 0, the increased domestic pollution tax reduces domestic output of X,
thereby raising the world price of X. How much world price increases depends upon the price
responsiveness of excess demand for X, i.e., on  < 0. The increased world price of X leads to
more foreign pollution as Rptz =  @z
@p < 0 ) @z
@p > 0. Thus, the amount of carbon leakage is
directly related to jRptzj and inversely related to jj.
Finally, the relative ineciency of internationally tradable quotas, when pollution is not a
pure public good, is not due to carbon leakage, but rather to the revenue raised from foreign
rms from the sale of the quota. From a domestic welfare perspective, the revenue the government
raises from domestic quota sales does not augment welfare, but the revenue raised from foreign
sales does raise domestic welfare (though, from a world perspective, it is just a transfer). Thus,
given the foreign quota level, the domestic government knows that when it issues one more quota,
world aggregate pollution will increase by one unit (just as when the quotas are not tradable).
It also knows that some (one-half, in the symmetric equilibrium) of these quotas will be sold to
foreigners, so if the price paid for the quota, z, exceeds the marginal damage to the domestic
economy of that increased foreign pollution, eu, then selling more quotas is benecial. Hence,
the problem with tradable quotas is not carbon leakage, but rather the revenue impact of quota
sales. Finally, note that pollution taxes are likely to be superior to tradable quotas when the
carbon leakage eect is small and the welfare impact of spillovers is small (e.g., when jj is large
or  is small), whereas the tradable quotas will be preferable when carbon leakage is large and
the welfare impact of spillovers is also large.
Since the only reason a rst best solution is not obtained is because of the failure to internalize
the international pollution spillovers, it is fairly clear that the welfare rankings of dierent policy
instruments follow the ordering of tax equivalents. Thus, for any case in which  2 (0;1], the
22non-cooperative equilibrium will result in lower welfare than the cooperative equilibrium, and for
any  2 (0;1), the case of internationally nontradable quotas will be welfare superior to both
internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes. The internationally tradable quotas will
provide higher welfare than pollution taxes if, and only if,  > M, i.e., only when international
spillovers have a signicant impact on welfare and carbon leakage under taxes is large.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have used a simple model to highlight the eect of trade liberalization in the presence of
transboundary pollution and to evaluate the welfare ranking of dierent policy instruments when
countries strategically set domestic environmental policies. The autarky equilibrium is inecient
because countries do not internalize the transboundary eects of domestic emissions. The Pareto
ecient equilibrium requires both countries to internalize the eects of transboundary pollution
and is, naturally, welfare improving. The outcome of trade liberalization depends on the par-
ticular policy instrument used to regulate pollution. The movement from autarky to free trade
can be welfare reducing. In the symmetric non-cooperative tax equilibrium, carbon leakage, by
increasing foreign emissions under trade, reduces the benets of tighter domestic environmental
policy. Although, in equilibrium, there is no trade in our symmetric model, the possibility of
trade provides the opportunity to inuence world prices and inuence foreign emissions, thereby
leading to a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse o
relative to autarky.
When internationally nontradable quotas are the policy instruments, changes in domestic
policy do not aect foreign emissions and there is no incentive to distort domestic policy. Even
when the quotas are tradable across countries, if pollution is a pure global public bad, then there
is no race to the bottom. However, if pollution is not a pure global public bad, then there is a
race to the bottom in environmental policy with internationally tradable permits, which, again,
makes both countries worse o as compared to autarky. Here, when pollution is not a pure public
bad, the revenue from foreign sales raised by the additional quota exceeds the marginal damage
done to the domestic economy by the foreign pollution, and this revenue eect leads to a race to
the bottom in that more pollution quotas will be issued.
The internationally nontradable quota equilibrium is welfare-superior to both the interna-
23tionally tradable quota equilibrium and the tax equilibrium. Whether the internationally trad-
able quota equilibrium strictly welfare-dominates the tax equilibrium depends on the severity of
transboundary pollution and the relative slopes of the demand and supply schedules in the two
countries. Pollution is the lowest when internationally nontradable quotas are the policy instru-
ments and the pollution ranking of the internationally tradable quota equilibrium and the tax
equilibrium depends on the ratio of transboundary to domestic pollution and the relative slopes
of the supply and demand schedules. Although we have analyzed the symmetric equilibrium to
isolate the role of carbon leakage, it should be clear that, by continuity, our results hold even if
we deviate from the symmetric case, provided countries are suciently similar.
We nd that internationally nontradable quotas are welfare-superior to taxes. Other factors,
such as imperfect competition or imperfect information, might favor price-based policies. Hence,
this warrants a more careful analysis of the choice and restriction of policy instruments in the
presence of transboundary externalities and strategic policy settings. The importance of the
proper choice of policy instruments becomes more crucial the more similar countries are, because
certain instruments may result in both countries being worse o with trade liberalization, while
others do not. An important policy implication is that, when countries negotiate on free trade,
it might be benecial to negotiate on the policy instrument, if not the exact level of the policy
instrument, that is used to regulate the domestic externality in each country.
A possible avenue of future research is to allow for imperfect information between countries,
and verify if the welfare rankings of policy instruments derived in this paper hold in a sequential
game, where countries try to infer about the preference or technology of each other from their
choice of policy instrument. Future work could also analyze the ranking of these policy instruments
when pollution causes a production externality.
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